In this essay, I attempt to outline my view on the existential status of God. Not in terms of whether God exists or not, but in terms of how God would exist if he indeed exists. In others words, I aim to explicate my understanding at least provisionally of the mode of existence of God. This is thus a reflection on "theo-ontology" or a study on the mode of existence of God.
Elsewhere, I have explained my preference for a non-substantialist, non-essentialist view of God as opposed to the traditionally dominant substantialist or essentialist view upheld by classical monotheism. I will not repeat my arguments against such substantialism/essentialism here. Suffice to say that it is my position that unless we adopt a non-substantialist, non-essentialist view of God, we end up in the quagmire of tri-theism or the notion of three Gods in logical terms instead of the triune God as favoured by Christians.
Given non-substantialism or non-essentialism, what can we glean about how God generally, or the triune God specifically, would exist if indeed God exists. Drawing on the insights of Buddhist thinkers, there are two possible ways ontologically: (1) the mode of ontologically affirming negation; and (2) the mode of ontologically non-affirming negation. The first is the paradigm of thinkers such as Bhavaviveka, known philosophically as the middle-way autonomy school (svatantrika-madhyamaka). The second is that of thinkers such as Chandrakirti and Buddhapalita, known technically as the middle-way consequentialist school (prasangika-madhyamaka).
Middle Way Autonomy
For middle-way autonomy proponents, God is ultimately empty of being established solely by way of his own characteristics. This means that God does not exist by way of his own nature independent of language and conception that impute God into being as an existent. In other words, all that we can say and think and perceive of God is dependent on the superimposition of language and conception over and upon God's intrinsic characteristics. While it is possible to deconstruct the layer of linguistic and conceptual superimposition, it is not possible to do the same with God in his intrinsic characteristics. Hence, we can say that God exists ineffably by way of his own nature. This is an affirming negation, ontologically speaking. Such a view negates the establishment of God as existing from his own side by pointing to the inevitability of superimposed language and conception that establishes God's existence for us. At the same time, it affirms the ineffable existence of God by way of its intrinsic characteristics beyond words and ideas. From a theological standpoint, this middle-way autonomy view seems at first sight to be consonant with a Christian view of "divine mystery" wherein God's ultimate nature and existence is impervious to any kind of human knowledge on this side of creation, even if it is possible to speak and conceive of God in relative terms. But is that so? Is such assertion of the possibility of God's ineffable existence (or divine mystery) really the furthest one could go in coming to know God?
Middle Way Consequentialism
I do not think so. My view is that the middle-way consequentialist paradigm offers more solid grounds for claiming to be the furthest point of human knowledge of God, at least on this side of creation. How so? The middle-way consequentialist view is a non-affirming negation. This means that it negates the inherent existence of God from its own side because everything we can think or speak or know about God is totally dependent on language and conception. God, like all phenomena, is dependently arisen by way of imputation upon a valid basis. Imputation is none other than the activity of language and conception. Beyond this negation, the middle-way consequentialist does not proceed to affirm anything else in its place. There is simply nothing that can be meaningfully said about God beyond the totality of linguistic and conceptual content that forms what we mean by “God.” One might be able to call this the narrativized God.
Essentialists may object to any suggestion of God as constructed by language and conception, eschewing all notions of a narrativized God. Yet, cogent inquiry and analysis into how God could possibly exist would inevitably lead us into our direct immediate experience of what is, regardless of our likes and dislikes. The crux is this: whether we like it or not, is there any other possible way of asserting God’s existence that is independent of language and conception? Is not assumed revelation from sacred scripture itself constituted by language and conception, embedded in a narrativized thought-w0rld inextricable from culture and history? While one can argue that it is precisely divine revelation of truths that contributed to culture formation, what sound evidence is there to support this claim? Is this not a proverbial chicken and egg issue, whereby the jury is still out with respect to whether it is divine revelation pre-forming culture or culture incubating what is subsequently thought and perceived to be divine revelation?
Closing Argument
That said, perhaps the most cogent reason why the middle-way consequentialist view surpasses the middle-way autonomy view on God’s existence is this: it offers a first-person account of God’s mode of existence “from the inside” as it were. In contrast, the middle-way autonomy view of the same adopts a third-person account of how God truly exists. This third-person view waxes eloquent on God as if he was a separate entity from the interlocutor, standing some distance away for ontological statements to be made about him from afar. From that vantage point, the middle-way autonomy proponent can gaze towards God and assert claims about how God’s existence relies upon superimposition of words and ideas while having his intrinsic characteristics that establish him in an ineffable way. Whichever way we cut it, this ends up being a third-person articulation of God’s ontological status.
A middle-way consequentialist account of God’s ontological status stems from an insider’s perspective, so to speak. It is a first-person unveiling of the reality of God's being. Ensconced in God and abiding nondually with him, the view of God’s mode of existence opens up as in a clear vista devoid of “this” or “that” and “I” or “you,” free from all reified entities that cast separation and division. One no longer gazes upon God from a distance and cogitates his mode of existence, affirming it in one way or another. Rather, one is fully merged into God’s very own being and gazing outwards to envisage clearly the narrativizing of himself by way of words and concepts. In himself, God’s own being is empty of any inherent trace of reification and is experienced directly and totally as such. Only a luminous, pristinely aware, space-like emptiness effuses forth as one’s immediate fresh and naked “non-experience.” Here, we reach the end of words and ideas, leaving the rest to speak for itself in sheer unfabricated silence.
Conclusion
In the final analysis, this first-person middle-way consequentialist paradigm of God’s mode of existence is to me the most satisfactory, both intellectually and practically. Intellectually, it takes me to the furthest point of articulation about God and how he truly exists, surpassing all other theologizing and philosophizing. Practically, it deconstructs the delusively solid and fixated walls of mind that divide, pigeon-hole, and imprison our otherwise fluid and flexible intellect. It also unleashes our deep intuition and insight into reality regardless of our preferences and prejudices. Mind unbound and heart open, our spirit is able to soar to the highest vistas of freedom imbued with wisdom and love. That is what I am a middle-way consequentialist — a Buddhist ontologist who follows Jesus Christ in whom the fullness of triune divinity and perfect humanity dwells bodily.
